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Article 20

“I Won’t Grow Up”
Kathryn R. Kent
The Queer Child, or Growing
Sideways in the Twentieth Century
by Kathryn Bond Stockton. Series
Q. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2009. Pp. 312, 44 illustrations. $79.95 cloth, $22.95 paper.

Kathryn Bond Stockton, in her
daring and often dazzling new
book, The Queer Child (2009), not
only expands upon but reconceives
what it means to theorize children’s sexualities, the temporality
of childhood, and the question of
children’s erotic and economic
agency. Building upon the work of
James Kincaid, Lee Edelman, and
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, whose
groundbreaking “How to Bring
Your Kids Up Gay: The War on
Effeminate Boys” (1993) perhaps
inaugurates this inquiry, Stockton
posits a set of tropes or truisms
about Anglo-American queer children in the last century that no
doubt will reorient any work on
the subject in literary studies and
beyond. In so doing, she posits fiction as a privileged site for such explorations, arguing that because
queer children are “not a matter of
historian’s writings or of the general public’s belief . . . , the silences
[surrounding them are] broken
and broken almost only—by fictional forms. Fictions literally offer
the forms that certain broodings
on children might take” (2). Such a
stance, supported, albeit briefly,
through a sketch of the conceptual
limits of historical work on the
emergence of childhood in AngloAmerica in the last hundred years,
reiterates implicitly the power of
fiction (and film), one might even
say the fictional, as a cultural force.
Aesthetic representations occupy
this privileged position, Stockton
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argues, because of their different
relation to temporality. Fiction enables challenges to conventional
notions of time, which, she illustrates, is imagined as moving vertically. This conventional notion of
time is instantiated most literally
in the requirement that children
“grow up” and achieve maturity
most fully through heteronormative marriage and reproduction. In
stalling, twisting, stretching time,
Stockton claims fiction allows for
“growing sideways,” movement
through metaphor, the “spreading”
of associations. As she notes,
“Overall, I want to prick (deflate,
or just delay) the vertical, forwardmotion metaphor of growing up,
and do so by exploring the many
kinds of sideways growth depicted
by twentieth-century texts” (11).
She invokes Edelman’s criticisms
of conventional notions of history
as a linear assimilation of complexity into difference-denying fan
tasies of origin, identity, and
periodization, but rejects his call to
ignore history tout court. Instead,
Stockton, through her discussion
of the temporal queerness of childhood, proposes another version of
it, arguing for history as just
spread, a kind of accumulation
that changes how we view sequence but has no real beginning
or end: in a nod to Gertrude Stein,
she writes, “History will just keep
getting fatter” (39).
Stockton, in her claims for this
queer time, instantiates, to borrow
terms from Sedgwick’s taxonomy,

both universalizing and minoritizing versions of the queer child. On
the one hand, all children are queer
in the sense that they are “broadly
strange” (3), simultaneously always
already and not yet straight, due to
the invention of childhood as a period of sexual innocence (which
ironically, in a Foucauldian twist,
Stockton demonstrates, reveals the
underlying cultural fear of an inherent childhood sexual perversity
from which children must be protected). On the other hand, she
posits the quasi-minoritizing figure of the “ghostly gay child (emblem and icon of children’s
queerness)” (3). This figure represents a host of key associations:
first, there is the notion of ghostly
as semi-invisible, a metaphor for
the “hazy” and “shadowed” lives
of all children, which at base
are fundamentally unavailable to
adults: “The child is precisely who
we are not and, in fact, never were.
It is the act of adults looking back”
(5). Completely unknowable, except through unreliable memory,
these children, Stockton asserts,
should not be abandoned to absolute otherness, but be reimagined
through examinations of how they
are figured centrally through fantasy and/as fiction. Whether any of
what she argues thus applies to
“real” children appears to be less
interesting to her and in fact, in her
account, almost necessarily impossible to determine. To some readers, especially those invested in
making claims about the larger so-

	ON STOCKTON’s THE QUEER CHILD
cial and cultural history of children
and sexuality in the twentieth century, this will certainly be seen as
one of the limits of her study.
Yet, she also posits the somewhat more minoritizing view of
the specificity of the “ghostly gay
child”; unlike the queer child, this
child occupies a more particular
space in the last century’s reinvention of childhood (and in particular, though she does not explore it,
the historical emergence of the imperative to narrate the formation
of a sexual identity). I quote Stockton here in full since the concept is
luscious in its density:
Such a child, with no established forms to hold itself
in the public, legal field, has
been a child remarkable, intensely unavailable to itself in
the present tense. The protogay child has only appeared
through an act of retrospection and after a death. For this
queer child, whatever its conscious grasp of itself, has not
been able to present itself according to the category “gay”
or “homosexual”—categories
culturally deemed too adult,
since they are too sexual,
though we do presume every
child to be straight. The effect
for the child who already feels
queer (different, odd, out-ofsync, and attracted to samesex peers) is an asynchronous
self-relation. Certain linguistic markers for its queerness
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arrive only after it exits its
childhood, after it is shown
not to be straight. (6)
This child is a ghost, Stockton
clarifies, because
[t]he phrase ‘gay child’ is a
gravestone marker for where
or when one’s straight life
died. Straight person dead,
gay child now born, albeit
retrospectively (even, for example, at or after the age of
twenty-five). This kind of
backward birthing mechanism makes the hunt for the
roots of queerness a retrospective search for amalgamated
forms of feelings, desires, and
physical needs that led to this
death of one’s straight life. (7)
As Stockton so brilliantly points
out, while all children are required
to “delay” having or expressing a
sexuality, the signifier of a normative maturity (the pinnacle of
which is heteroreproductivity—
and here one hears the ring of the
clinical hand-wringing inherent in
the phrase “delaying sexual activity”), she argues gay children are
“put on hold in such intense ways”
that their stories are paradigmatic
for all others.1 One might wonder
at the general applicability of her
claims for the norm of “delay”; at
least for many poor children, especially poor children of color, the
underlying assumption that they
are always already sexual (as op-
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posed to innocent) complicates
such a formulation. Stockton addresses this to some degree in her
idea of the “child queered by innocence or queered by color.” Black
children, she argues, do not have
the privilege of innocence (a privilege that comes with the price of
seeing white children as weak and
lacking agency), given black children’s historical associations with
“strength and [sexual] experience”
(31). On the other hand, paternalistic, sentimental appeals to allow
such children to “have a childhood” reiterate the temporal logic
of stalling Stockton identifies, and
must turn the child into the object
of “abuse,” she argues, in order to
weaken them enough to qualify
for the “innocent” appellation. No
child may thus claim sexual agency
and remain “a child.”
Stockton elaborates on the temporal queerness imposed by the
norms of “growing up” as she outlines two more paradigmatic, perverse ways of conceiving children
and/or childhood. One is the figure
of the “grown homosexual,” who
is automatically assumed to be in
a state of “arrested development”
(22). To some on the Right, Stockton notes, this idea reflects the
ideology of queers as childlike,
narcissistic, stuck at an earlier level
of development, all problems that
can be cured through salvation and
reparative therapy so that queers
can achieve full maturity through
heterosexual marriage and procreation. Freud, Stockton argues,

presents this notion without making it a pejorative; other scholars of
his work might take issue with this
claim.2 Nonetheless, in her notion
of the “child queered by Freud,”
Stockton extends this reading of
arrested development to interrogate his strange, normative notions
of husbands as babies to wives, and
lesbians as mothers and daughters,
as well as the way (queer) children
reveal, through their various forms
of precocity, the sexual secrets
adults don’t always even know
they have. And in her fascinating
reading of Freud’s notion of perversion, she illuminates how he
conceives of this practice, in and of
itself, as a kind of erotic delay, a
“lingering” whose expanded definition includes “normal” foreplay
and which Stockton links to the
experiments with repetition in
Stein’s prose poetry and Picasso’s
cubist paintings.
Such connections to a wide variety of literary, filmic, and visual
media are where Stockton’s talents
as an extraordinary reader come
through. They are also the instances where her penchant for
Derridean riffs and Nabokovian
puns accumulate, even pile up,
metaphoric associations, some of
which may feel more like sheer
play (too childlike?) than essential
argument. Beginning with Henry
James’s “The Pupil” (1891) and
ending with Hoop Dreams (dir.
Steve James, 1994) and Charlie and
the Chocolate Factory (dir. Tim
Burton, 2005), Stockton takes us
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on a meandering stroll that sometimes doubles back on itself (this
book, true to its emphasis on the
horizontal, does not present a vertical climb towards a climactic
claim) through a panoply of disparate texts. Her assertions are cumulative—she returns to remind
us of key ideas as they once again
reveal themselves in ways that recall at their best Steinian repetition. In all of her chapters, she
explores the question of children’s
agency, always conceived as sexual
and frequently also through a relation to consumer consumption (the
two are, to use her terms, often
“braided” together). The latter
concept is key, she argues at her
most traditionally historical, because in the twentieth-century
childhood was invented as a space
“free” from labor, a space where
children’s consumption gave them
desires and agency apart from their
parents (even if adults still held the
purse strings). Children who long
for candy, children who now have
separate rooms in which to play,
children whose buying power exists in some uneasy relation to the
norms of commodity culture, just
as their sexual power exists in some
uneasy relation to the adult eroticization of children—these are
themes Stockton most explicitly
addresses (but does not attempt
fully to resolve) in most of her
chapters, from the relation of the
tutor and the pupil in James to the
figure of Nabokov’s eponymous
Lolita (1955) and her manipulation
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of Humbert (and Quimby’s possible manipulation of her) to the fantasy, expressed in Burton’s Charlie
and the Chocolate Factory, of owning the magical means of producing endless amounts of candy (and
by extension, money).
In these various contexts, “growing sideways” ends up meaning
many things. In British lesbian
novels of the 1920s, relations of
girls (and women acting like them)
to animals become alternative figures for female-female love. As she
puts it, “As a recipient of the child’s
attentions—its often bent devotions—and a living screen for the
child’s self-projections—its mysterious bad-dog postures of sexual
expression—the dog is a figure for
the child beside itself, engaged in a
growing quite aside from growing
up” (90). These works are suffused
with mother/daughter imagery,
which Stockton argues symbolizes
the public impossibility of Sapphic
desires:
Painting these women as
mother and child . . . shows
these lovers as doomed by
(their) time. Theirs is a time
that can never arrive: the time
when mother and child can be
lovers in the public’s embrace;
or when mother and child
will inhabit the same generation. These are clear impossibilities, akin to the historical
prematurity of queer love in
the 1930s, in a world so clearly
not ready to receive it. (93)
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In addition to illustrating this
“doomed” love, Virginia Woolf,
Radclyffe Hall, and Djuna Barnes
substitute girls’ love for dogs (and,
in Hall’s case, also a horse) to allow
for a different figure of affective
relations.
Stockton’s interpretation of
Nightwood’s (1936) bizarre conclusion, in which Robin seemingly
goes mad, getting down on the
floor and barking in light of the
failure of her relationship with her
lover, Nora, is the most convincing
I have read: Stockton argues that,
in becoming canine, Robin can become “her lover’s dog and thus legally belong to her lover” (93). In
this reading, what appears at first a
form of demotic devolution becomes instead a sideways temporal
strategy; similarly, Stephen Gordon’s connections to animals signal
her status as “out of (heterosexual)
time, and are her route to connections with other women” (it is
through a dog, for example, that
she meets her first lover). Stockton
writes, “[T]he world of horses and
dogs offers girls—here youngwomen-who-are-not-seekingmen—what they can’t easily or
otherwise discover: a lateral community that understands, affirms,
and offers sorrows for unsupported choices” (100–101). Moreover, “[l]ike the queer child who
will never be straight, who puts the
goal of socially-sanctioned couplehood on perpetual delay, [the dog]
grows sideways in relation to his
mistress” (101). Stephen famously

relinquishes Mary because she cannot give her a normal life and children, only a dog that marks the
space between them. Whether cats
occupy a different lateral relation
to lesbian coupledom, Stockton
does not say, but her explanation
here of queer girls’ attachments to
other animals finally explained to
me the horse-obsessed peers of my
childhood.
My imagination was not as captivated by the second half of the
book, which ranged from readings
of the “arrested development” of
the queer, childlike murderer in
Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood
(1966) to the question of intent versus motive and its relation to childish, yet queer desires in Peter
Jackson’s Heavenly Creatures (1994)
to the queerly Oedipal relations of
black, poor pseudo-sons to white,
upper-middle-class parents in Six
Degrees of Separation (dir. Fred
Schepisi, 1993). Especially in the
last chapter, which argued that all
black children are queer, I found
myself considering the political
ramifications of such a claim. On
the one hand, Stockton’s ideas
might be seen to echo Cathy J. Cohen’s classic argument that disparate groups of marginalized people,
for example, “punks,” “bulldaggers,” black welfare mothers, and
others, could form coalition, not on
the foundation of identity politics,
but on the basis of their shared experience of marginalization as
“queer” (i.e., having a nonnormative relation to production and/or
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reproduction).3 On the other hand,
by the time Stockton got to Hoop
Dreams, the focus shifted more to
economic exploitation and inequity than to a specifically sexual relation to commodification.4 I also
began to wonder, despite the complexities of temporal instability the
book illustrates, what constituted a
child, as increasingly Stockton focused on adolescents, whose relation to sexuality throughout this
century has been much more
fraught than “innocence” can represent. Furthermore, the teleology
inherent in “being” a sexual identity goes relatively unquestioned;
rather, Stockton just shows how
one out of necessity may not fully
fit the dominant temporal model,
thus ironically she may risk reinforcing the imperative. Finally, the
book opens up delicately the ethical question of how far one should
go in acknowledging (rather than
just fantasizing retrospectively or
in the present) the sexual agency of
a child—without offering any concrete suggestions for social change.5
These reservations aside, for
someone who enjoys the pleasure
of following the death-defying interpretive leaps of a daring critic,
this book is candy. For anyone interested in how to think about Anglo-American childhood and the
figure of the child, it is required
reading. Sedgwick, in Epistemology of the Closet, famously writes,
“A point of [this] book is not to
know how far its insights and projects are generalizable, not to be
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able to say in advance where the
semantic specificity of these issues
gives over to (or: itself structures?)
the syntax of a ‘broader’ or more
abstractable critical project.”6
Stockton follows this model: in a
way, she leaves us hanging, waiting for the prescriptive ending; in
another way, she provokes us into
rethinking everything we thought
we knew about childhood.
Kathryn R. Kent is a professor of English and
the Chair of Women’s and Gender Studies at
Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts. She is working on a book on queerness
in the Girl Scouts and on the authorized
biography of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick.

Notes
1.

I should note that Stockton is careful to
point out that not all adults who
identify as gay will see themselves in
this figure and that some straight
adults will recognize themselves in it
despite their identification as heterosexual.

2.

Stockton definitely lands on the side of
those who see Freud as challenging any
notion of the normal rather than those
who see him as reinforcing normative
notions of gender and sexuality.

3.

Cathy J. Cohen, “Punks, Bulldaggers,
and Welfare Queens: The Radical
Potential of Queer Politics?” in Black
Queer Studies: A Critical Anthology, ed.
E. Patrick Johnson and Mae G.
Henderson (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2005), 21–51.

4.

It seems important to mention that the
pairing black/poor is not inevitable,
something Stockton does not fully
explore in her notion of black children
as always already strong and thus
associated with physical labor, which in
turn connotes economic necessity. One
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might consider the degree to which
economically privileged African American children, because of their class
status, may attain “innocence” and be
seen as in need of protection.

5.

Although Stockton does worry about
the new possibilities engendered by the
fact that “gay children” are now
allowed to exist and name themselves,
a shift she traces to the 1990s, she
acutely balances a sense of the
possibility inherent in such a development with the worry that this will
“desexualize” gayness.

6.

Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology
of the Closet (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990), 12.

